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NOTES 
Sections 184 and 185 of the Invention Secrecy Act-An 
Ambiguous and Unnecessary Obstruction to Foreign 
Patenting 
Several recent decisions have revealed an ambiguity in sections 
184 and 185 of the Invention Secrecy Act.1 Section 184 allows the 
filing of a patent application in a foreign country only upon receipt 
of a license from the Patent Commissioner or after the expiration of 
a six-month period which begins when the application is submitted 
to the United States Patent Office for examination.2 If this section is 
violated inadvertently by unlicensed foreign filing within six months 
of the filing in the United States Patent Office, the Patent Commis-
sioner is empowered to issue a license that retroactively validates 
the prior foreign application.3 Sectiorr 185, however, states that, 
"notwithstanding any other provisions of law," a violation of section 
184 will result in the loss of domestic patent rights.4 This ambiguity 
has raised the question whether the retroactive license authorized 
in section 184 can resurrect an unlawful application-unlawful be-
cause accompanied by an unlicensed foreign filing-that has already 
ripened into a purported domestic patent, or whether such a license 
is effective only if issued while the domestic application is pending.G 
Courts recently faced with this issue have reached conflicting 
decisions. In Minnesota Mining b Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co.0 it was 
held by a federal district court in Ohio that the Patent Commis-
sioner's jurisdiction over violations of the foreign-filing provisions 
1. 35 u.s.c. §§ 181-88 (1964). 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1964): "Except when authorized by a license obtained from the 
Commissioner a person shall not file or cause or authorize to be filed in a foreign 
country prior to six months after the filing in the United States an application for 
patent or for the registration of a utility model ••• in respect of an invention made in 
this country • • . • The license may be granted retroactively where an application 
has been inadvertently filed abroad and the application docs not disclose an invention 
within the scope of section 181 of this title." Section 181 establishes the procedure to 
be followed by the Patent Office in processing patent applications involving classified 
material. See note 27 infra. 
3. 35 u.s.c. § 184 (1964). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 185 (1964): "Notwithstanding any other provisions of law any person 
••• shall not receive a United States patent for an invention if that person ••• shall, 
without procuring the license prescribed in section 184 of this title, have made, or 
consented to or assisted another's making, application in a foreign country for a 
patent •.•• A United States patent issued to such person, his successors, assigns, or 
legal representatives shall be invalid." 
5. It is usually required that Congress clearly vest the Patent Commissioner with 
authority over an issued patent before the courts will allow the Commissioner to 
exercise such jurisdiction. Cf. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 
U.S. 606 (1898); Terry v. Webster, 12 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The question that 
has arisen, in effect, is whether § 184 clearly endows the Commissioner with jurisdic-
tion over a patent that has left his office. 
6. 240 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
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terminated upon the issuance of a United States patent. The plain-
tiff in that case obtained a' domestic patent after its five violations 
of section 184 had gone undiscovered. The court held the domestic 
patent invalid from the date of issue, refusing to give effect to a 
retroactive license granted by the Patent Commissioner following 
the issuance of the patent.7 District courts in other circuits, how-
ever, had previously adopted a more liberal interpretation of the 
remedial provisions of section 184.8 In In re Rinker & Duva9 the 
Patent Commissioner stated that he found nothing in section 184 
that would restrict the time at which he could grant a retroactive 
license, but acknowledged that the matter was one for judicial 
determination. The federal district court in New Jersey subsequently 
upheld the Commissioner's position.10 Since the Minnesota Mining 
case was decided, its narrow interpretation of section 184 has been 
presented as precedent to three other courts, all of which have re-
jected it in favor of the earlier, more liberal, construction of the 
remedial provisions.11 
An examination of the relevant statutory language and history 
indicates that the liberal, majority interpretation is preferable. The 
court in Minnesota Mining limited the issuance of retroactive 
licenses to the period prior to the granting of the patent, basing its 
decision upon the use of the term "application" and the absence of 
the word "patent" in the last sentence of section 184.12 The court 
reasoned that this choice of language was intended by Congress to 
prevent that section's remedial provisions from being applied to 
granted domestic patents.13 However, this analysis is unsound, as 
7. Id. at 155. 
8. Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 319 (D.N.J. 1965); Blake v. 
Bassick Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1965); McCulloch Motors Corp. v. Oregon 
Saw Chain Corp., Civil No. 919-57-PH, S.D. Cal., July 29, 1963. 
9. 145 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Pat. Comm'r 1964). 
10. Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 319 (D.N.J. 1965). 
11. On the basis of the decision in Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 
240 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1965), new motions were made for summary judgment 
in Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., supra note 10, and Blake v. Bassick Co., 146 
U.S.P.Q. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1965), in which contrary decisions had previously been reached. 
The courts, however, refused to reverse their earlier holdings. Blake v. Bassick Co., 
146 U.S.P.Q. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 325 
(D.N.J. 1965). In addition, the Patent Commissioner, relying upon the Minnesota Mining 
court's interpretation of § 184, has refused to issue retroactive licenses in cases where 
patents had already been granted. Consequently, tlvo patentees filed separate manda-
mus actions against the Commissioner, and the district court of the District of Colum-
bia ordered him to issue retroactive licenses to the petitioners upon finding that their 
violations of § 184 had been inadvertent. McCormick v. Brenner, 146 U.S.P.Q. 340 
(D.D.C. 1965); Pillsbury Co. v. Brenner, 146 U.S.P.Q. 99 (D.D.C. 1965). The court in 
each of these cases expressly rejected the interpretation of § 184 set forth in Minnesota 
Mining. Thus, of the eight judicial decisions involving the issuance of retroactive 
licenses, seven have held that there is no restriction as to the time at which such a 
license may be granted. 
12. See note 2 supra. 
13. In a footnote to the opinion the court said: "We note the very clause upon 
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the court apparently failed to recognize that the word "application" 
in section 184 refers only to foreign applications. The section does 
not speak of domestic applications and, therefore, the particular 
language used is not a relevant consideration in determining whether 
the operation of the savings clause was intended to be limited to the 
period of domestic application. Also, an absurdity is created if the 
language of section 185, which excludes all other statutory provi-
sions from consideration,14 is applied to obviate the provisions of 
section 184,15 as in the Minnesota Mining case. The two sections 
should be read together. Thus, where section 185 refers to the 
"license prescribed in section 184," it should be recognized that a 
retroactive license is one so prescribed.16 
Further support for a liberal interpretation of the ambiguous 
provisions of sections 184 and 185 is found in an examination of 
the statutory predecessors of the Invention Secrecy Act. In the 
nventy-year period prior to World War II, foreign patenting was 
not restricted by the United States; this policy was changed, how-
ever, because of the security problems inherent in preparing for 
war. Legislation in 1940 gave the Patent Commissioner the power 
to prohibit patent applications in foreign countries if the applica-
tions contained classified material.17 This act was later amended to 
require American inventors to obtain licenses from the Patent Office 
before filing any patent applications abroad.18 Under the amended 
act, there was no provision for retroactive licensing; unlicensed 
foreign filing prevented issuance of the domestic patent or, if the 
patent had already been issued, invalidated it. Post-war legislation, 
however, partially alleviated the hardships suffered by inventors 
under the licensing act.10 A new amendment provided for the grant-
ing of a retroactive license in cases where violations of the prior 
act had been inadvertent.20 Although the language of this amend-
merit could· have been construed to apply only to licenses issued 
which the plaintiff relies here permits a retroactive license to issue only when the 
application discloses no harmful information; if Congress had intended to extend 
the Patent Office jurisdiction beyond its normal administrative reaches, it would have 
included the phrase 'or patent' after 'application.'" Minnesota Mining 8: Mfg. Co, v. 
Norton Co., 240 F. Supp. 150, 155 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
14. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 39-41, filed Oct. 14, 1965, Minnesota Mining 8: 
Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., Civil No. 37, 154, 6th Cir. (pending hearing), for an explana• 
tion of the origin of the "notwithstanding'' clause of § 185 and a compelling argument 
that this clause is intended to exclude only 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 119, 8: 172, and is 
inapplicable to § 184. 
15. See Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 319, 322 (D.N.J. 1965). 
16. See Blake v. Bassick Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 157, 160, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
17. Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710. 
18. Act of August 21, 1941, ch. 393, § 3, 55 Stat. 657. 
19. For a statement of the purpose of the legislation and the situation necessitating 
its enactment, see H.R. REP. No. 1498, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). 
20. Boykin Act, ch. 910, § 6, 60 Stat. 940 (1946). 
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before the amendment took effect, the Patent Commissioner felt 
that since it was remedial legislation it should be liberally inter-
preted, and therefore applied the amendment prosp~ctively, subse-
quently issuing licenses to qualified applicants.21 Since the provisions 
of the Invention Secrecy Act under discussion are merely a con-
tinuation of the temporary wartime and postwar remedial legisla-
tion,22 the retroactive-license clause of section 184 should be 
interpreted liberally, as was its predecessor. 
Even under the liberal interpretation allowing the Patent Com-
missioner to cure a defect in an issued patent, sections 184 and 185 
are not a satisfactory solution to the problems confronting Congress 
in the field of extra-national patents.23 Congress is faced with two 
conflicting policy considerations: protection of the private rights of 
American inventors in the dissemination of technical data, and 
maintenance of national security.24 The present statutes neither 
provide the Government with the opportunity to examine all tech-
nical data destined for export nor minimize the unnecessary loss 
of domestic and foreign patent rights by American inventors. 
It is significant that in all the recent cases involving violations 
of section 184, the unlawful filing was brought to light by private 
parties, and then only after both domestic and foreign patents had 
been issued.25 The Government has neither the means of preventing 
the actual filing of patent applications abroad nor an agency to dis-
cover violations of the foreign licensing provisions.26 If and when 
21. See In re Lee&: Heineman, 77 U.S.P.Q. 659 (Pat. Comm'r 1948). 
22. H.R. REP. No. 828, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951) . 
. 23. See Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Report of Committee 
No. 2, International Patent Relations and Conventions, A.B.A. REP. 32 (1958), for a 
discussion of the defects in § 184. See generally Ansell, Security Considerations in 
Filing Patent Applications Abroad, 50 A.B.A.J. 946 (1964). 
24. See SUBCOMMITl'EE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., lsr SESS., STUDY No. 5 ON THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
SYsrEM AND FOREIGN PoUCY PURSUANT TO s. REs. 55, at 4 (Comm. Print 1957) (herein-
after cited as STUDY No. 5): "Today United States policy with respect to international 
patent relations must be shaped in light of vital, even if at times confused foreign 
policy objectives • • • • The aim of securing maximum elbow room abroad for our 
inventors must be reconciled with foreign policy aims in the post-war world." 
25. In Blake v. Bassick Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 157 (N.D. ill. 1965), and Minnesota Mining 
&: Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 240 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1965), the defendants in patent 
infringerqent suits used violations of § 184 as an affirmative defense to show the patents' 
invalidity. The plaintiff in Englehard Indus. v. Sel-Rex Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 319 
(D.N.J. 1965), sought a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity because of similar 
violations. The patentees in McCormick v. Brenner, 146 U.S.P.Q. 340 (D.D.C. 1965), 
and Pillsbury v. Brenner, 146 U.S.P.Q. 99 (D.D.C. 1965), sued the Patent Commissioner 
to compel the issuance of a retroactive license under § 184. 
26. While no statistical data are available, the number of recent cases involving 
violations of § 184 would seem to indicate that the statute is not an effective deterrent 
to potential violators. Theoretically, inventors who violate § 184 are stripped of their 
domestic patent rights by § 185, and may be liable to criminal prosecution under 
§ 186. However, an inventor can interpose a claim of inadvertence as a defense to 
the penalty of § 185; the efficacy of such a defense is indicated by the fact that no• 
reported application to the Commissioner for a retroactive license under the "inad• 
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violations are brought to its attention, the Government can only 
determine in retrospect whether national security was jeopardized 
by foreign disdosure of the patented materials. 
The failure to provide the Patent Office with the opportunity to 
prohibit initially the export of classified data is not the only short-
coming of the present Invention Secrecy Act. From the standpoint 
of the inventor this statute poses serious problems when the subject 
matter of a patent application is not such as would result in a 
secrecy order under section 181.27 Some inventors, seemingly not 
realizing the imperativeness of the Secrecy Act's provisions, feel that 
it is within their province to determine the presence or absence in 
their patent applications of material which might be significant to 
national security.28 Finding no security problem, they inadvertently20 
file applications in foreign countries in violation of section 184. Such 
a procedure can lead to the loss of the domestic patent which has 
been granted on a similar application.3° Furthermore, when the 
procedure of section 184 is followed, although domestic patent 
rights are not endangered the resulting delay in foreign filing may 
cause the loss of similar rights in other countries.31 In addition, 
since the scope of protection granted under foreign patent laws and 
the requirements for disclosure in other countries differ from those 
vertent violation" provision of § 184 has been found which was denied on the 
ground that the violation was deliberate. No criminal prosecution under § 186 has 
been brought against a violator of § 184, and it is doubtful that § 186 is applicable 
where the violation is inadvertent. If § 186 were used to prosecute inadvertent viola-
tions, the incongruous result would be reached that an unlawful application could 
be validated under § 184 while the inventor was being prosecuted for having made 
the application. 
27. See International Patent Relations and Conventions, supra note 23, at 35-36, Sec 
also note 2 supra. A secrecy order is issued by the Patent Commissioner under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 181 (1964), when, in the opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary 
of Defense or of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, the publication and disclosure incident 
to the patenting of an invention would be detrimental to national security. The 
invention is kept secret for such period as the national interest requires, but the 
applicant is compensated for damages resulting from the secrecy order and for any 
use of his invention by the government. 
28. International Patent Relations and Conventions, supra note 23, at 38. 
29. A question may arise as to whether these filings are in fact "inadvertent," In 
some of the discovered violations the patentees have been large corporations which 
should be cognizant of the foreign licensing provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act. 
It is possible that the patentees, in their haste to secure foreign patent rights, have 
simply ignored the statute, relying on either the dearth of prior prosecutions or the 
liberality of the Patent Commissioner in negating earlier infractions. 
30. E.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Colema_n Instruments, Inc., 338 F.2d 573 
(7th Cir. 1964); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 240 F. Supp. 150 (N,D. 
Ohio 1965). In Beckman there was no application for a retroactive license, and a 
patent that had been issued in violation of § 184 was declared void. 
31. For a discussion of the time considerations in foreign filing, see generally 
SHERMAN, PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION 225 (1st ed. 1963); Graham, Foot-
notes on Foreign Patent Practice, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 623 (1957); International Patent 
Relations and Conventions, supra note 23, at 35; Ostenfeld, Problems of European 
Patent Protection, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 739-55 (1952). 
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of the United States, it frequently becomes necessary to furnish sup-
plementary data to foreign patent offi.ces.32 Section 184 has been 
interpreted as requiring a new license for any modification of the 
corresponding United States application to be sent abroad.33 This 
requirement may result in the loss of valuable foreign priorfry rights 
when deadlines for :filing amendments cannot be met because of the 
necessity of obtaining such a license.34 Furthermore, in highly com-
petitive fields the delay may permit a foreign inventor to obtain an 
earlier :filing date. Thus, the dilemma posed for inventors by the 
Invention Secrecy Act has unjustifiably frustrated the traditional 
goal of protecting private property rights in technical developments. 
It has been the policy of the United States Government in recent 
years to encourage the dissemination of technical data to benefit 
allied nations and satisfy the needs of underdeveloped countries in 
their quest for increased technical capacity.35 Pursuant to constitu-
tional authority,36 Congress has chosen to promote the sharing of 
our scientific achievements by private agreements and foreign 
patents.37 In the area of mutual defense production, Congress has 
enacted technical-property agreements with other countries which 
seek to eliminate, or at least minimize, the loss of private property 
rights in classified material.38 Similar steps should be taken to 
protect the rights of American inventors whose inventions are un-
related to the nation's defense. One such step would be an amend-
32. See International Patent Relations and Conventions, supra note 23, at 35. 
33. In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 338 F.2d 573 {7th 
Cir. 1964), the court held that any new disclosure required a separate license even 
though the application was merely a continuation-in-part of an earlier one. For an 
analysis of the problems involved in such situations, see Klotz, United States Con-
tinuations-in-Part Abroad, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 791 (1958). 
34. Article 77(1) of the proposed European Patent Law states that if an examination 
of a patent application reveals that the invention does not meet the patentability 
requirements, the applicant will be notified and invited to remedy the deficiencies 
within a period to be fixed by the examining agency. If this law goes into effect, the 
deadline for filing amendments will become arbitrary in the Common Market 
countries, and American inventors will be further disadvantaged by the requirements 
of § 184. An unofficial translation of the Proposed European Patent Law can be found 
in H.M. STATIONERY OFF., PATENT LAws AND LEGISLATION-EUROPE (Gt. Britain Board 
of Trade 1962). 
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 1961, 
A SUMMARY PRESENTATION (March 1960). See generally Westerman, International Ex-
change of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes, 21 FED. B.J. 
152 (1961). 
36. "Congress shall have Power .•• to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.'' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
37. Congressional policy is set forth in Pub. L. No. 118, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 
195, subch. VII, § 7I0(a) Ouly 16, 1953), amending The Mutual· Security Act, Pub. L. 
No. 165, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 479 (Oct. 10, 1951): "[I]t is declared to be the policy 
of the United States •.• to encourage American enterprise in contributing to the 
economic strength of other free countries through private investment abroad and 
the exchange of ideas and technical information . . . .'' 
38. See STUDY No. 5, op. dt. supra note 24, at 4. 
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ment of sections 184 and 185 of the Invention Secrecy Act to 
eliminate the difficulties encountered by domestic inventors seeking 
foreign patents. 
Section 184 could be amended to provide a general license for 
the exportation of unclassified data for the purpose of filing, amend-
ing, or prosecuting patent applications abroad.39 The Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce has issued a similar license authorizing any 
person to export to all destinations unclassified technical data gener-
ally available in published form, and to export unclassified, un-
published data to countries outside a special area.40 Such an amend-
ment would, of course, pla:ce upon the inventor or his attorney the 
responsibility of recognizing security problems,41 but the same duty 
is imposed upon engineers and scientists under the Bureau of Foreign 
Commerce license.42 Furthermore, it is unlikely that national security 
would be endangered by such an amendment. Only unclassified 
material would be licensed for filing, and such material is currently 
being submitted to foreign countries without prior governmental 
examination.43 
If the proposed provision were not considered by Congress to 
be adequate for national security needs, however, an alternative 
amendment could be adopted that would tend to ensure govern-
mental examination of all patent applications prior to submission 
to foreign offices. The Government could more effectively prohibit 
unlawful foreign filing by retaining the penalties now prescribed 
for violations of section 184 and deleting the provision of that sec-
tion concerning retroactive licenses. Inadvertence could no longer 
be claimed by an invent~r as a mitigating circumstance,44 and un-
39. International Patent Relations and Conventions, supra note 23, at 34. 
40. 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1964). 
41. Criminal penalties could be imposed for the willful foreign filing of patent 
applications containing material that clearly should be classified. It would seem that 
little danger of an unintentional breach of security would result, even without prior 
governmental screening, as the inventor or his lawyer would certainly recognize at 
least the possibility of an infraction. In all instances of inadvertent filing thus far 
uncovered, the inventions involved have been completely innocuous. For example, the 
invention in Minnesota Mining was a scouring pad. 
42. The United States is the only nation having foreign filing regulations of the 
type found in the Invention Secrecy Act. For a compilation of the foreign patent 
regulations of other countries, see STUDY No. 5, op. cit. supra note 24, at 59,64. Most 
nations place the responsibility for recognizing defense interests upon the patentee, 
allowing him to file without restriction if his patent is unclassified. The German 
law is typical. See id. at 61: 
[In Germany] there is no general legal prohibition against filing an application 
for a patent abroad. Nevertheless, an applicant who is aware of the interest of 
an invention for defense, whether or not he has been notified of a decision to 
impose secrecy, might be committing an offense if he filed an application abroad, 
If he knows or suspects that his invention is of interest from the standpoint of 
defense, he can request the Defense Department to give a ruling. It depends on 
the reply of this authority whether the applicant is allowed to file his application 
abroad or must refrain from doing so. 
43. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra. 
44. If prior governmental examination of all patent applications to be filed abroad 
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conditional loss of domestic patent rights, coupled with the criminal
penalties prescribed in section 186, would seem to be both a sufficient
deterrent to willful violations and a sufficient incentive to extreme
caution in doubtful cases. If, in addition, a procedure could be es-
tablished by which the Patent Office would be notified of all foreign
filings by American nationals-possibly by agreement with foreign
patent offices-this amendment would effectively cause all patent
applications to be channeled through the Patent Office before pub-
lication abroad. It would seem, however, that the hardships occa-
sioned patentees by such an amendment would far outweigh any
resulting increase in security protection.45 For this reason, the sug-
gested amendment providing a general license for foreign filing
would appear to be a better solution.
The present provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act are causing
problems for inventors which are unjustified in terms of what the
statute actually accomplishes in protecting national security. Seek-
ing to protect both national security and private property rights,
sections 184 and 185 of the act accomplish neither goal. Compliance
with these provisions endangers the foreign priority rights of in-
ventors, and noncompliance may jeopardize both national security
and domestic patent rights. A liberal interpretation of the remedial
provisions of section 184 is insufficient to minimize the loss of
foreign patents, and tends to foster violations of the licensing
statute. Since no effective governmental pre-filing examination now
exists, and since the recognition of information which should be
kept secret poses little difficulty, Congress should remove the present
obstacles to foreign patent filing by granting a general license for
the foreign filing of unclassified patent applications.
is important to national security, there is no sound basis for allowing the defense of
mistake of law in a violation of the provisions requiring such an examination.
45. The delay in foreign filing caused by such an amendment could cause the loss
of priority rights in foreign countries, and the deletion of the remedial provisions
could result in a domestic inventor's losing all property rights in his invention simply
because of his negligence.
Notes
